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Even where the fee of a street is in the public, the construction of an ordinary
railroad along and over it is a damage to abutting property, within a constitutional
provision for compensation for property damaged.
For injuries or annoyance which the owner of the abutting property shares in
common with the general public, he is not entitled to compensation, but for those
damages which are peculiar to him, which affect his property without injuring that
of his neighbor, he may recover.
A municipal corporation authorizing the use of the street by a railroad is not
liable in damages to the abutting lotholder. If the ordinance simply grants a
license on behalf of the general public, the city is not liable, and if it was intended
to confer the power of occupying the street to the damage of the abutting lot without
compensation it is unconstitutional and invalid.
For injuries of this kind a single recovery can be had for the whole damage to result
from the act-the injury being continuing and permanent. The measure of compensation (in suit between the proper parties), is the actual diminution in the market value of the premises, for any use to which they may reasonably be put,
occasioned by the construction and operation of the railroad through the adjacent
street. No personal inconvenience or annoyance, no interference with the owner's
trade or business, no decrease in the rental value of the premises occasioned by the
road, and no temporary interruption or damage thereby, constitutes the test; these
things can only be considered as they may aid in determining the actual depreciation
of the market value of the realty and improvements. And if the owner receive
benefits from the road peculiar to himself, and not shared by the general public,
this fact should be considered a determining the amount of his compensation.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
HELM, J.-Plaintiff below seeks to recover in this action for
the obstruction of free ingress and egress to and from his lots by
means of the street upon which they front; and for a depreciation
in the value of his property caused by the construction and
operation upon the street, of the railroad mentioned in the
pleadings.
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Three questions are fairly presented for adjudication by the
record before us:
First. Is the abutting lot owner in this State entitled to compensation when the adjoining street is occupied by an ordinary
railroad, and his property is thereby injured. Second. If he is,
did the City of Denver become liable therefor through the action
of its council in passing the ordinance recited in the answer; and
Tird. If the adjacent proprietor is entitled to compensation, what
is the proper measure of damages by which the same shall be
determined.
The abutting lot owner has a peculiar interest in the street; he
has rights therein not shared by the general public. If the fee
thereof be in the muncipality, he owns an easement therein; this
easement or right though incorporeal and intangible, often gives
to the realty whatever value it may be found to possess : without it
the land and the improvements thereon may be of little use or
benefit; with it they may yield to the owner a handsome revenue;
this is especially true of business streets and business blocki erected
thereon.
Property in its broader and more appropriate sense is not alone
the chattel or the land itself, but the right to freely possess, use?
and alienate the same ; and many things are considered property
which have no tangible existence, but which are necessary to the
satisfactory use and enjoyment of that which is tangible. The
people and the courts of Colorado are constantly treating as property the right to a use of a water acquired by priority of appropriation ; the right of user 'would of course be of no value without the
water, but it is this right that is mainly the subject of ownership.
Incorporeal hereditaments, particularly those denominated easements, have always been considered property both by the civil and
the common law. They are generally attached to things corporeal,
and arc said to "issue out of or concern" them; but any wrongful
interference therewith has been promptly recognised and punished
by the courts.
No good reason is observed for discriminating against the easement in a street connected with the lot of an abutting owner. We
are disposed to say that it is property within the meaning of our
constitution ; and any interference therewith which results in
injury to the realty must, with the exceptions hereinafter stated,
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be justly compensated; if in such a case there be no technical
" taking" 'of private property, there is a damaging thereof within
the constitutional inhibition. Whatever permanently prevents the
adjacent owner's free use of the street for ingress or egress to or
from his lot, and whatever interference with the street permanently diminishes the value of his premises, is as much a damage
to his private property as though some direct physical injury were
inflicted thereon.
But sometimes these interferences and resulting injury may
properly, even in this State, be held to be damnum absqueinjuria,
as where they are occasioned by a reasonable improvement of
the street by the proper authority for the greater convenience of
the public, or where a mere temporary inconvenience or injury
results from a legitimate use thereof by the public.
The streets of a municipal corporation are highways ; they are
dedicated to the use of the general public, and it has a right
therein in the nature of an easement; a right which is termed an
easement by some of the authorities; whether the fee thereof be in
the city or in the adjoining owner, this right of the public ordinafily remains the same; if in the former, such fee is generally in
trust for the benefit of the public; if the latter, it is subject to the
right of user or enjoyment by the public, for all the ordinary and
legitimate purposes of a highway. With us the control thereof is,
in either case, vested by law in ihe municipal government. It is
the duty of the city council to protect and improve the same in
such manner as will render it most useful for a highway. In
determining what changes and improvements are most conducive
to this end, the council exercises a large discretion. And unless
unreasonable changes are made, or injury results to the adjoining
premises, through the unskilfulness or negligence of those
employed, the owner thereof will not be heard to complain ; though
in fact, the real value and convenience of his property are diminished thereby; for in purchasing his lot, or in relinquishing the
public easement, he is conclusively presumed to have contemplated
this power and authority of the municipal government, and is held
to have anticipated any injury to his abutting land resulting from
a reasonable and proper exercise thereof.
But it must be borne in mind that these presumptions attach only
*so long as the purpose of the change is to render the 8treet more
convenient and useful as a highway. When this object is aban-

CITY OF DENVER v. BAYER.

doned, and the council direct or permit a change or use wholly
foreign to the ordinary purposes of a highway, and when thereby
adjacent property is actually damaged, the owner thereof is, in this
State, entitled to reasonable compensation for the injury.
The abutting owner may well be presumed to have taken into
consideration the fact that the grade of the street might be raised
or lowered, that pavements might be laid, and bridges and culverts
constructed, and that a street railroad even, might be built and
operated thereon; and it may fairly be presumed that in purchasing, he anticipated and allowed for the possible or probable damages to result from these and similar changes, or that he signified
his consent thereto, and thus deprived himself of any right to compensation therefor.
But no such presumption, consent or estoppel, applies to the use
of the street by an ordinary railroad. The argument that such a
railroad is an improved public highway, and therefore its construction and operation in the street is only an improved and appropriate use thereof, we do not regard as resting either upon correct
principle or sound logic.
The street is designed for local convenience and use, and is
dedicated thereto ; it should be entirely unobstructed, save as
temporary obstructions occur in the improvement thereof by the
proper authorities, or in its legitimate use by the public.
An ordinary railroad is not a local convenience; the city is but
one of its termini; its cars do not stop at the beck of any one who
may wish to ride, and do not commonly transport passengers from
one point to another within the city ; its ties and rails, as generally
laid, are a permanent interference with the use of the street for
ordinary vehicles, the smoke and dust, interruption and noise produced by operating its trains, are a perpetual annoyance, and the
danger a constant menace in the occupation and enjoyment thereof
for the usual purposes.
We cannot escape the conclusion that such a railroad is an additional burden of servitude, not comprehended within the easement
for an ordinary public street or highway ; a burden or servitude
which the abutting owner cannot be presumed to have anticipated
or cdnsented to.
The railroad is a public benefit; it is generally of great advantage to the town or city to or through which it is built and
operated, and for any injury or annoyance occasioned thereby,
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which an adjoining ownei shares, in common with the general
public, he ouglit not to recover; but for those damages which are
peculiar to him, which affect his property and impair its value
without injuring that of his neighbor, he ought in justice to receive
cothpensation.
We are aware that upon some of these questions the Courts are
by no means in accord; our views conflict with the decisions of
Courts for whom we entertain the profoundest respect. But while
this want of harmony is to be regretted, it cannot be avoided, for
agreement with all the able decisions is impossible. No attempt has
been made to review in this opinion the cases ; the task would have
been too long and laborious. We have not stated exhaustively the
reasons controlling the views adopted upon this branch of the
case, nor shall we undertake to do so. There are, however, a few
subjects and decisions, which we feel called upon to more specifically consider.
A distinction has sometimes been made with reference to the
fee of the highway. The doctrine is announced and supported by
a strong preponderance of authority that if the fee of the street be
in the public, or in the municipality for the use of the public, the
Legislature may authorize it to be used for the construction and
operation of a railroad, without compensation to the adjoining property owner, against his wishes.. And, of course, the Legislature
may delegate to the municipal authorities power to grant the same
privilege, with like immunity from liability to lot owners along the
street occupied. See the following works and the cases cited therein :
2 Dillon Municipal Corporations, sec. 556; Mills on Eminent
Domain, Sec. 203; Cooley's Const. Limitations, p. 687 (5th ed.).
We are not, as may at first seem, ignoring this doctrine, or
necessarily denying its correctness under the law prevailing where
it has been declared. A careful examination shows that almost
without exception, those decisions which consider the subject and
deny a right to compensation for injury where the abutting owner
does not also own the fee of the street, were rendered under constitutions which require compensation only for the taking of private
property ; and a majority of those opinions are largely occupied in
analyzing the word taken, and in defining its meaning as used in
their respective constitutions.
The Constitution of Colorado contains the following provision:
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"Private property shall not be taken or danzaged for public or
private use without just compensation."
We believe that the framers of this instrument did not insert the
words " or damaged" therein, without a purpose ; we cannot consent to the proposition that these words add nothing to the word
taken also used, and that the provision would be just as broad
without them; it ishardly necessary to invoke the canon of construction which forbids that we shall consider them as either
meaningless or merely cumulative.
The position taken in some of the cases is, that if the adjoining
owner have not the fee of the street, and the value of his property
be diminished fifty per cent. by the construction of a railroad
therein, he has no redress; while if he be the fortunate owner of
this fee, he may recover not only for the taking or appropriation
of the street, but also for the interference with his easement, and
the decrease occasioned in the value of his premises.
Yet whether he own the fee or not his rights in connection with
the street, while it remains a street, are practically the same. His
possession of this fee in no special way contributes to the use or
enjoyment of his lot, and enables him to exercise no greater control over the street, than he would have without it.
This distinction as to the fee seems to rest upon the fact that in
one case there is a wrongful incumbrance of his freehold, while in
the other there is not. The actual injury inflicted is about the
same in both. But while, if the fee vests in the city, there may
be no wrongful incumbrance of his estate, in the sense of these
cases, there is, under our Constitution at least, a damaging thereof
for which he is entitled to compensation.
Constitutional provisions, where only the taking of private property is to be compensated, have frequently been held to include any
3' direct physical obstruction or injury" to the abutting premises,
ever, though there be no actual appropriation of the ground itself;
as where by excavation or embankment, water was caused to overflow the same ; a kind or class of injuries for which, in the absence
of constitutiomal or statutory enactment, a remedy existed at common law. The Toledo, MVabashl &JMesterly BZy. (o. v. Morrison,
71 Ill. 616 ; Hooker v. The Plew Haven &' .HI. Co., 14 Conn.
146; .Pumplly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166.
We think this construction of the provision eminently reasonable and just. Accepting it as correct, we are forced to draw the
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inference that the words " or damaged" with us were intended to
reach still another class of injuries. To this class belong, in our
judgment, those complained of in the case at bar. Upon this subject see, Gottschalk v. C. B. & Q. RailroadCo. (S. 0. Neb.) ; The
Reporter, No. 13, vol. 16, p. 402; also, Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U. S., 635, and other cases hereinafter considered.
There has heretofore been no interpretation of our constitutional
provision by this Court, with reference to damages such as those
complained of in the case before us.
The rights of the parties in Colo. Cent. Railroadv. Aollandin,
4 Col. 154, accrued prior to the adoption of that instrument, and
for this reason, although the decision was rendered subsequent
thereto, no mention was made, or discussion had, of the constitutional inhibition. But section 48 of chapter 18, Revised Statutes
of 1868, provides that private property shall not be "taken or
injuriously affected" without compensation.
This statute
remained in force till 1876 ; and it may be urged that the decision
in the Mollandin case above mentioned was governed thereby.
We may admit that the words of the statute "injuriously
affected," are as comprehensive in meaning as the word "damaged" used in the constitution, and yet not be concluded by the
foregoing decision. The statute was not relied upon or discussed
in that case ; not a word appears in the opinion itself, nor in the
briefs and arguments of counsel, to show that it was even remotely
considered. The opinion of a Court is not decisive of a question
not mentioned therein, althougfi the same might have been passed
upon. It is generally a party's privilege to waive a statutory
right, and Courts, particularly those of last resort, do not as a rule
press upon litigants the benefit of a right or privilege which they
have elected not to invoke or claim.
Had the* Court been called upon for a construction of thAt
statute, it is probable that a view would have been adopted similar to the one here announced as to our constitutional provision.
The 68 sec. of the "1Lands Clauses Consolidation Act," 8 &
9 Vict. ch. 18, contains the following language: "If any party
shall be entitled to any compensation in respect to any lands or
interest therein, which shall have been taken for, or injuriously
affected by, the execution of the works, and for which the promoters
of the undertaking shall not have made satisfaction," such compensation was to be determined as in the act provided.
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It will be observed that this section contains the words "1taken"
and "injuriously affected" used in our statute of 1868 ; and it is
not improbable that these words were borrowed either directly or
indirectly from see. 68 aforesaid, or from some other English act
using them in the same connection.
The English courts in interpreting this statute have usually (not
always), held that the words "injuriously affected," only allow
compensation where a right of action would have existed at common law. Yet in their application of this construction they have
been extremely liberal, sometimes declaring that actionable at common law which we generally do not so consider.
In feCarthy v. Metropolitan Board of Works, L. R., 7 C. P.
508, the action was brought to recover for the depreciation in
value occasioned to plaintiff's premises by the stopping up and
destruction of a certain dock near the same; "plaintiff had no
right or easement in the dock, other than his right as one of the
public, nor was there appurtenant, or otherwise belonging, to plaintiff's premises any easement or privilege in or to the dock." But
by reason of their proximity thereto, there being only a narrow
street between, the buildings were rendered valuable either to sell
or occupy, and by the destruction thereof they were permanently
damaged and diminished in value. The Court, per WILLES, J.,
say: "Notwithstanding the striking differences of opinion which
have been expressed upon this subject, I cannot entertain the
slightest doubt that what was done here was an injurious affecting
of the plaintiff's property which would have given him a cause of
action before the statute, and which entitles him to compensation
under section 68." The plaintiff's recovery of 19001. was sustained.
In The -East and West India -Jocks v. Gattke, 3 McNaughten
& Gordon Rep. 154, defendant professed to have "incurred great
pecuniary loss and damage by reason of the construction of the
plaintiff's railway in the immediate vicinity of his premises ;" he
claimed compensation under said act, on the ground that his property was injuriously affected.
The Lord Chancellor declined to maintain an injunction preventing defendant proceeding by suit to collect damages for the injury.
His Lordship suggests that under this statute a party is entitled
to compensation where his lands are not "taken, used, or directly
interfered with," but where there is a " consequential" injury,
resulting in the actual depreciation of the value thereof.
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Beccett .v. Jfidland _Ay. Co., L. R., 3 0. P. 82, was a case
where the highway, fifty feet wide in front of plaintiff's premises,
was narrowed by means of a railroad embankment to thirty-three
feet in width. Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that by the
narrowing of the road and the embankment, the value of his property was reduced.
BoVILL, 0. J., speaking of the property being injuriously
affected, under said section 68, says: "I am also of opinion that,
but for the act of Parliament which authorized the making of the
railway and the narrowing of the road, an action might have been
maintained by the plaintiff for such injury, and that he is entitled
to claim compensation under ,the provisions of the acts I have
referred to ;" and WILLEs, J. : " I am of the same opinion * * *
It must be conceded that there was a damage to the owner of the
house from the narrowing of the road in front of it. It is not
worth so much to sell or let as it was before. I will not cite
authorities upon a matter which is so plain."
The learned judge who delivers an opinion in 1?igney v. The City
of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64, formulates the rule deducible from the
foregoing and other cases in the following language: If "there
has been some direct physical disturbance of a right, either public
or private, which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his property, and which gives to it an additional value, and (if) by reason
of such disturbance he has sustained special damage with respect
to his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally," the common law would, but for some legislative enactment,
afford him redress. A recovery was sustained where the injury
resulted from the construction, without negligence, through the'
public street, of a viaduct by the municipal authorities.
It is immaterial whether or not we declare the English rule thus
formulated in Illinois, sufficiently broad to recognise a right of
action at common law in cases like this; for whether we so conclude and say with these English cases, interpreting words similar
in meaning to those of our constitution, that such language only
gives a right to recover where it would have existed at common
law; or whether we interpret the provision of our constitution, as
did Lord WESTBURY the English statute, as recognising a new
right of action, the result is the same ; in either event parties are
entitled to compensation for such injuries as are here complained of.
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Lord

WESTBURY,

in the case of Ricket v. Director of the lletro-

politan By. Co., L. R., 2 Eng. & Irish Appeals 175, questions
the correctness of the above rule as applied to the English statute,
in the following vigorous language : "If this view be correct, it
follows that it is a mistake to lay down, as I find in several cases,
and in effect in the judgment of four judges in this case, that the
injury intended by the words injuriously affected, must be one of
which, if there had been no statute enabling the company to do the
act, an action would have laid for the injury at common law."
And again, he says: " When, therefore, the general railway acts
use the term ' injuriously affected,' the word 'injuriously' does not
mean 'wrongfully' or ' unlawfully;' nor does it imply that compensation is limited to cases where the act done is such as but for
the powers given would be a tort at common law. The words
mean 'damnously affected' only. * * * * There is nothing in
the statutes to warrant the position that there shall be no compensation where at common law there would have been no right of
action."
In Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, the court, in
speaking of the constitution of Illinois of 1870, say : "It ordains
that private property shall not be taken or damaged-for public use
without just compensation. This is an extension of the common
provision for the protection of private property."
The following cases were decided under constitutional inhibitions
similar to ours in this respect; and they assume without discussion, that the words or damaged thus used are the recognition by
their respective constitutions of a new right of recovery ; they do
not limit such right to cases where an action would, without the
constitutional provision, have lain at common law.
Williams v.
G. C. " S. . By., Vol. 1, No. 34, Denver L. J. 267; Graves v.

G. C. fS. . By., 1 Texas Law Review 8; Johnson v. Parkershurg, 16 West Va. 402; Moore v. City of Atlanta, Vol. 1, No.
10, Denver L. J. 78; City of Atlanta v. Green, (Sup. Ct. 67 Ga.,
386, Sept. Term, 1881) ; City of Elgin v. .Eaton, 83 Ill. 535.
The two Texas cases, i. e., those of Williams and Graves, above
mentioned, were brought to recover for injuries, from the use of
the street by a railroad. The others were against the cities for
damages caused in grading the streets by their respective councils.
The right to recover compensation was sustained in all.
As will be observed, we do not go so far as some of these cases;
VOL. XXXII.-57
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that our position might not be misunderstood, we have, at the risk
of being charged with obiter dictum, suggested, that as at present
advised we think that for injuries caused by a reasonable change
or improvement of the street by the council in a careful manner,
the abutting owner should not recover.
We now proceed to consider the liability of the city in this case
for such compensation. The ordinance before us might perhaps
be construed as in no way undertaking to compromise the right
of adjoining owners, in cases like this, to compensation ; but simply
as granting a license on behalf of the public and the city government, to occupy the street in question; we might possibly regard
it as merely a declaration that both the city government and the
general public consented to such use of the street, and would
interpose no objection or obstacle thereto. To this extent the
council had power to act; beyond this it cbuld not go. Under
such a view of the ordinance, no one would contend for a moment
that the action against the city could be maintained.
On the other hand, if the ordinance in question was intended to
confer upon the company a right to use the street for railroad
purposes without compensation to adjoining owners, where permanent injury resulted from the use, it is in this respect an effort to
authorize something expressly forbidden by the Constitution. The
act of the council was a clear usurpation of power not possessed;
the ordinance in so far as it denies the right to compensation is
ultra vires and void. We find no statutory provision authorizing
such action by the city council, and if such a statute existed it
would also be void.
But if the city council assume, or attempt to assume, powers not
conferred, their action is not binding upon the corporation. (2
Dillon, Munic. Corp., sees. 767, 768, 563, cases cited.) Certainly a municipal corporation cannot be bound by the action of
its council sanctioning or attempting to sanction a disobedience
of law.
The case of Stack v. The City of -ast St. Louis, 85 Ill. 377,
cited by counsel, might possibly be thought to recognise a right
of recovery in a case like this, upon the doctrine of principal and
agent. But we cannot realize the fitness of this application of the
rule of agency, If the city council determine to make some
change in the street for the benefit of the public, and proceed to
do the work, the contractors or employees would be the city's
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agents; for injuries arising from their unskilfulness or negligenco
the municipality would unquestionably be liable. But the construction of an ordinary railroad is not, as we have found, an improvement of the street for the convenience and benefit of the local
public; it is a private enterprise for private profit; true, the city
attaches certain conditions to the license granted, such as that the
road shall be upon a certain grade, that culverts shall be constructed for the gutters and planks laid at the crossings, but otherwise the municipal authorities do not control the enterprise.
Whether we term the railroad company purely a private, or
whether we call it a quasi public corporation, the situation remains
unchanged; in constructing and operating the road it is acting
for itself, and not for the city. It is no more the city's agent,
than is the individual licensed by ordinance or resolution, to
engage in some legitimate private business requiring such license
or authority. If the railroad company disobey the law, in building or operating its road, the city is no more responsible therefor
than it would be for a tort of the private individual in the pursuit
of his business aforesaid.
The remaining question to be passed upon refers to the measure
of damages adopted by the court in admitting testimony, and in
charging the jury.
Unlike actions for trespass to realty, where the plaintiff can only
recover for the injury done up to the commencement of the suit, in
suits of this kind a single recovery may be had for the whole
damage to result from the act; the injury being continuing and
permanent.
After thorough examination of the cases, we are of opinion that
the following rule is just and equitable, and that it is sanctioned
by the weight of authority.
When the action is against the proper party and the plaintiff is
entitled to recover, the measure of his compensatioft is the actual
diminution in the market value of his premises for any use to which
they may reasonably be put, occasioned by the construction and
operation of the railroad through the adjacent street.
The jury must not, of course, consider any fluctuations in value
resulting from other causes.
No personal inconvenience or annoyance, no interference with
his trade or business, no decrease in the rental value of his premises
occasioned by the construction or operation of the railroad, and no
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temporary interruption or damage thereby, constitutes the test.
None of these .things can enter into the question, except as they
may appropriately aid in determining the actual depreciation in
market value of the realty and improvements.
If by reason of the proximity of the railroad thereto, plaintiff's
property is in any way peculiarly benefited; that is, if he experiences a benefit therefrom not shared generally by the property
owners of the city, such benefit should be considered and the
value thereof allowed in determining the amount of his compensation.
The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded, with
directions to the District Court to dismiss the action.
Reversed.
It would be difficult to conceive a
question of greater importance to property owners than that which regards
their rights as against the public in the
exercise of the powers inherent in it by
virtue of eminent domain. It is universally conceded that the ultimate disposal of all the property within its
borders for the general good of its
citizens, ought to be in the Commonwealth. Only upon this doctrine can
private good be made subordinate to.
public good, and internal improvements
and conveniences be multiplied. But it
is obvious that so wide and so absolute
a power, unless most strictly defined
and limited, will be subject to most
glaring abuses, and productive of deplorable injustice and tyrannical destruction of individual rights, which it is the
Commonwealth's chief duty to protect.
Accordingly the exercise of this power has
been limited to cases where the private
property is required for public use, and
under different circumstances in different
jurisdictions, the party against whom
the power is exercised must be compensated. With the vexed question as to
what is, or is not, a public use, this note
has nothing to do. It is proposed herein
merely to review some of the cases, which
like the principal case, are concerned
with the question, under what circum-

stances is a private individual entitled to
compensation for injuries caused by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain ?
The decisions are almost everywhere
based upon statutory provisions. In the
United States, with one or two exceptions, the constitutions of the several
states, as well as the Federal Constitution, contain articles upon the subject.
In England, it is the subject of careful
provision by statute. In that country
one whose property is "injuriously
affected" is entitled to be indemnified.
In addition to the English cases cited by
the learned judge who delivered the
opinion in the principal case, must be
noticed that of Caledonian Railroad Co.
v. Walker's Trustees, L. R., 7 App. C.
259, which follows and affirms Metropolitan Morks v. McCarthy, L. R., 7 H.
L. 243. It goes a little further than the
latter case and shows a decided tendency
towards compensating the owners of
property for any loss which can at all
fairly be said to arise from the prosecution of the authorized work.
The trustees were possessed of a
spinning mill ninety yards from an
important main thoroughfare in Glasgow,
having parallel accesses on the level from
two sides of the mill to the thoroughfare.
A railway company under their special
act cut off entirely one access, substi-
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tuting therefor a deviated road over a that the dock had been a special adbridge, with steep gradients. And the vantage and peculiar privilege of the
other access they diverted and made plaintills. Counsel contra, said that
less convenient. But none of the their argument was put distinctly by
operations were carried on cx adcerso tile Lord PENZANCE iln MCUrtl-y's Case:
premises. When the bill was before "In each case the right to compensaParliament the trustees were induced to tion will accrue, whenever it can be
withdraw their opposition in considera- established to the satisfaction of the
tion of an agreement by which the jury or arbiter that a special value
company undertook that in the event attached to the premises in question
of the land of the trustees and of others by reason of their proximity
to, or
being injuriously affected by the con- relative position
with, the highways obstruction of any of the works proposed structed,
and that this special value
by the bill, their claim to compensation
has been permanently destroyed or
should not be barred by reason of the abridged by
the obstructions."
company not taking part of their land.
Opinions were delivered by Lords
The trustees claimed compensation SELBORNE, O'I{AGAN,
BLACKBURN,
for the diminished value of the pre- and WATSON.
All agree in affirming
mises by reason of the detour and the decision
of the lower court, Lords
gradient. The plaintiffs had succeeded SELnOa and O'HAGAN distinguishing
in the lower court, and the company
Ogilvy's ('Cse, Lord BLACKBURN proappealed. Counsel for appellants cited nouncing it inconsistent with
McCarthy's
and relied on Ogilvy's Case, 2 Mfacq.
Case, and preferring the latter, while
229, and endeavored to distinguish Lord WATSON declines to say
whether
McCarthy's Case, supra. They stated they are reconcilable or not. The law,
the following to be the test: "If you as laid down by Lord SELBORNE very
have such a special and peculiar relation clearly, is as follows (p. 276) : 1. When
between the subject that is damaged a right of action which would have
and the property, as is different from existed, if the work in respect of which
that enjoyed by the rest of the world, compensation is claimed, had not been
then your claim will arise; if you have authorized by Parliament, would have
not, then your claim will not arise. For been merely personal without reference
instance, if the alteration of tme level to land or its incidents, compensation is
of the road were by lowering it, and the not due under the act. 2. When damowner of the house had steps presented age was not out of the execution, but
to him instead of the road, that inter- only out of the subsequent use of a
ference is sharply distinguished from a work, then also there is no case for
case in which persons going along a road compensation.
3. Loss of trade or
have to go tip or down a gradient." In custom, by reason of a work not otherOgilvy's Case there was a crossing of a wise affecting the house or land in or
public road by a railway, on the level, upon which trade has been carried on, or
within fifty yards of the complainant's
any right properly incident thereto, is
lodge, and gates were placed across the not by itself a proper subject for comroad. There was held to be no claim pensation. 4. The obstruction, by the
for damages. the plaintiffs having no execution of the work, of a man's direct
rights in the road different from that of
access to his house or land, whether
the general public. It so far, therefore, such access be by public road or by
sustained the position taken by the private way, is a proper subject for
appellants, and they thought to distin- compensation.
guish McCUarty,'s Case on time ground
Lord BLACHIBURN'S opinion contains
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his usual clear and succinct review of
the authorities, citing and repudiating
the dictum of Lord CnANwoRTt, in
Ricket v. Metropolitan Railroad Co., 2
H. L. 175, 198, in which he said,
"Both principle and authority seem
[to me] to show that no case comes
within the purview of the statute, unless
where some damage has been occasioned
to the land itself in respect of which,
but for the statute, the complaining
party might have maintained an action.
The injury must be actual injury to the
land itself, as by loosening the foundations of buildings on it, obstructing
its light or its drains, making it inaccessible by lowering or raising the
ground immediately in front of, or by
some such physical deterioration; any
other construction of the clause would
open the door to claims of so wide and
indefinite a character as could not have
been in the contemplation of the legislature."
In America, the Constitution of the
United States, those of Maine, New
Hampshire,Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, New Jersey, Florida, Mississippi,
Arkansas, Missouri, New- York, Maryland, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Nevada, California
and Oregon, provide that private property shall not be "taken," etc., without compensation.
In Kentucky, South Carolina, Alabama and Tennessee, the words used
are "Taken or applied to."
In Pennsylvania, "Taken, injured or
destroyed."
In Illinois, Colorado, Georgia, Nebraska and West Virginia, "Taken or
damaged."
damaged or
In Texas, "Taken,
destroyed for, or applied to."
In Virginia, "Deprived of their property."
In Massachusetts, "appropriated to."
In North Carolina, Delaware and
Kansas there appear to be no provisions
on the subject.

Of course there is much conflict
between the decisions in the different
states, with such diverse legislation.
But the cases are not all harmonious
even where the constitutional provisions
are the same, or practically so. It will
be at once observed that the great
majority of constitutions simply provide
for compensation when property is
actually taken. It will be well to
examine the cases under those constitutions first.
In the United States Courts, in the
case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13
Wall. 166, in construing the Wisconsin
Constitution, the Supreme Court, in deciding the plaintiff entitled to recover
for injuries caused by the back flow of
water, held, in an opinion by MILL R,
J., that it is not necessary that property
should be absolutely taken in the narrowest sense of the word to bring the case
within the protection of the constitutional provision. And in Transportation
Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, it was
said that Pwmnpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
and the New Hampshire cases cited
infra go to the extreme limit of the
liberal construction of the constitutional
provision, and are to be sustained on
the ground of a physical invasion of the
property. But that where, as in the
case before the court, the injury was
consequential only, there could be no
recovery.
In Maine, it is competent for the
legislature to authorize acts for the publie benefit, although they operate injuriously, without compensation to the
party injured provided no property is
taken or appropriated, or is attempted
to be taken and appropriated, to the public use: Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247,
approved in Nichols v. Railroad, 43
Id. 356. In Cushman v. Smith, at pp.
257, 258, the intention of the constitutional provision is explained as merely
to prevent the taking of property or its
destruction, or permanent appropriation
to public use, and not to guard against
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does not base its argument merely upon
the proper construction of the word
taking," but also goes largely into the
questions of what is meant b" the word
Ccproperty,"-a line of argument afterwards adopted in New York.
Crossing the imaginary line dividing
Xew Hampshire from Vermont, we shall
find in the latter state a very different
rule. There it was held in Livermore v.
Jamaica, 23 Vt. 361, that taking land
for a highway is not such an appropriation of it as deprives the owner of his
title, and, therefore, does not entitle him
to compensation. And subsequently in
Hatch v. TV. Central Railroad Co., 25
Vt. 49, a railroad was held liable for
diverting the course of a stream-but in
the course of an able opinion, REDFiELD, C. J., said: "It was held, too,
in Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch.
162, that one could not be deprived of
the benefit of a stream of water by the
state, even, without compensation, and
the defendants were enjoined from building an aqueduct by public grant. * * *
These and some other cases of a similar
character seem to be founded on reason
and justice, and do not at all conflict
with the general principles before laid
down by us, that the defendants are not
liable for merely consequential damages
to land taken or expressly affected in
of rights, and the correlation of rights themselves as in the case where water
and obligations necessary for the highest
is diverted or caused to overflow the
enjoyment of land by the entire commu- land."
And in Connecticut, there can
nity of proprietors," and commenting
be no recovery for consequential damaon Eaton v. Railroad, the court said : ges,. such as obstructing a highway or
"Two of Eaton's proprietory rights in
weakening the foundation of a house:
the tract of land described as his farmBradley v. Railroad Co., 21 Conn. 294.
his right of exclusive possession and his
In New Jersey, a railroad crossing a
right of reasonable use of the soil-inhighway must compensate the owner of
cluded the right that the soil should not
the soil : Starr v. Railroad Co., 4 Zab.
592. But when a railway is laid on a
be injured," &c.
These two very carefully considered
highway, the public retaining the genecases are perhaps as strong a presentation
ral use of the highway, there is no right
of the argument for a liberal construeto compensation. And in any event
tion of the constitutional provision as there can be no recovery for consequential injuries: Railroad Co. v. Newark,
are to be found in the books. It will be
noticed in reading them that the court
2 Stock. 352. But where the property
nere injury to the property, however
great.
In New Ilampshire the subject has
b cin elaborately discussed in the two
important cases of Eaton v. Railroad,
51 NL.II. 504, and Tlonzqson v. Androscoggin Co., 54 Id. 545. The former
case was an action to recover for injuries
to the plaintiff's land by an overflow of
a river, against which, before its removal by tie railroad, he bad been protected by a natural barrier. Through
this barrier a cut had been made by the
railroad and water escaped through it
upon the plaintiff's land. It was of
course contended that there was here no
such "taking"
as was necessary to
entitle the plaintiff to damages. But
the court, in a learned and exhaustive
opinion by SMITH, J., came to an opposite conclusion. And it was pointedly
said that a destruction of the ability to
use property was all one with a destruction of the property itself. This ease will
well repay perusal, and is followed and
approved in Thompson v. Androscoggin
Co., also a case of overflow, wherein
the court held the following language:
" Property in land must be considered
for many purposes not as an absolute
unrestricted dominion, but as an aggregation of qualified privileges, the limits
of which are prescribed by the equality
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is destroyed (Am. Print Works v. Lawrence, 1 Zab. 249), or is directly and not
remotely injured, as by the flowage back
of water, there must be compensation:
Tinsman v. Railroad Co., 2 Dutch. 148;
Trenton Water Works v. Raff, 7 Vroom
336.
In Minnesota, where a railroad is laid
on a public street, the adjacent owner is
entitled to compensation if he own the
fee of the street. The same rule prevails in Iowa: Davis v. Railroad Co.,
46 Iowa 389 ; Barr v. City of Oskaloosa,
45 Id. 275 ; Frith v. Dubuque, Id. 406;
Kircheman v. Railroad Co., 46 Id. 366.
In the last case there was considerable
difference of opinion among the judgesa majority holding that where part of
the land was taken, i. e., the fee of the
street--consequential injuries to the
house must be paid for. In Maryland,
in a case where, by a change of grade
in a street, sand, &c., were drained into
a mill-race, obstructing the flow of water,
it was held that there could be no recovery against the city. But it was also
said that where real estate is actually
invaded by a superinduced addition of
water, earth, &c., this would be a taking
within the meaning of the Constitution.
The courts of Wisconsin and Michigan
hold an owner entitled to compensation
for injuries directly resulting from the
defendant's acts : Chapman v. Railroad
Co., 33 Wis. 629 ; Parks v. Railroad
Co., Id. 4i3; Grand Rapids v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308. But there can be no
compensation for injury from a railroad
laid on the street unless the plaintiffs
own the fee: Railroad Co. v. Ileisel,
38 Mich. 62. Of the states whose constitutions provide that property shall not
be taken or injured (or damaged), the
cases in Pennsylvania hold broadly, now,
that consequential damages are recoverable: Reading v. Althouse, 93 Penn. St.
400; Pusey v. Allegheny, 10 W. N. C.
561. This could not have been so prior
to the Constitution of 1873-the former
constitution providing merely against a

taking. Tile remarks of Chief Justice
GIBSON, in O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18
Penn. St. 187 (decided in 185 1), are often
quoted: "But to attain complete justice, every damage to private property
ought to be compensated by the state or
corporation that occasioned it, and a
general statutory remedy ought to be
provided to assess the value."
The law is substantially the same in
Kentucky ("taken or applied to"),
Nebraska, and West Virginia, as in
Pennsylvania: Richmond Turnpike Co.
v. Rogers, 1 Duv. 135, 141 ; Gottschalk
v. Railroad Co., 14 Nob. 550 (LAKE, C.
J., dissented) : J7ohnson v. Parkersbury,
16 W. Va. 402. So in Illinois: Rigney
v. Cicago, 102 Ill. 64. But there is
no disposition even in these states to
extend compensation to cases where the
injury is but remotely caused by the acts
of the corporation-for example, in
Hyde Park v. Dunham, 85 Ill. 570, it
was held that the injury resulting to lots
not taken for the purpose of widening a
street, by making the lots in the enlarged
street more attractive than those in the
neighboring street, and so diminishing
the value of the lots in such neighboring
streets, need not be paid for. And see
Richmond Turnpike Co. v. Rogers, I
Duv. 135. The same general rule obtains in Georgia : Railroad Co. v. Steiner,
44 Ga. 546. In South Carolina (" taken
or applied to "), if the obstruction of a
public street is authorized by law, the
damage arising therefrom to an individual land-owner is damnum absque
injuria: McLaughlin v. Railroal Co., 5
Rich. 583.
The cases in New York are important
and interesting. The change has been
gradual from a strict to a broad construction of the words "taken" and "property" used in the constitution of that
state. 'In The Canal Appraisers v. The
People, 17 Wend. 571, Chancellor W~rwoRTa considered the destruction of a
mill site on a small stream by the rising
of its waters, caused by improving the
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larger stream into which it flowed, such
a " taking " of property as would entitle the owner to compensation, but the
majority of the senators thought differently, and tie damage was held by a
majority of thirteen to eleven to be
damnum absque injuria. In The People
v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188, the court held
that the laying of a street railway, even
though it should be a nuisance to tile
adjacent owners and interfere with the
enjoyment of their property, would not
entitle them to compensation. And
where, in pursuance of an act of the
legislature, a public bridge connecting
a pier with the adjoining land was removed, by reason of which it was necessary to reach the plaintiff's store by
means of a bridge at a much greater
distance, it was held that no damages
could be recovered, the injury being
remote and consequential: Coster v.
Mayor, 43 N. Y. 399. But if one
avenue of approach be closed and no
other left open, it was implied in Fearing v. Irwin, 55 N. Y. 486, that an
action would lie for compensation.
In The Matter of The Elevated Bailroad, 70 N. Y. 327, the question as to
whether there could be a recovery for
consequential injuries resulting from the
use of that road, was evaded in the
opinion of the court, on the ground that
compensation had been provided, but
RAPALLo and ANDEEWS, JJ., dissented
on the express ground that there had
been no adequate provision for compensation. Caro v. Mfetropolitan Railroad
Co., 14 J. & S. 138, was elaborately
argued, and by very distinguished counsel. The case was a bill for an injunction to restrain the elevated railroad from
operating in front of the plaintiff's
dwelling, no corppensation having been
made him for the injury to his property.
The brief of the plaintiffs is a masterly
exposition of the theory and meaning
of "property," and will repay perusal.
The court granted the injunction, holding that "property" is the "free use,
VOL. XXXIL-58

enjoyment and disposal of all one's acquisitions without control or distinction ;' and as a result from this that the
polluting the air of one's dwelling with
noisome (though not unwholesome)
smells, constitutes a "taking."
And
when the Court of Appeals were at
length forced to meet the question
squarely in Story v. Metropolitan Elerated Railroad Co., 90 N. Y. 122, a
similar decision was reached, though by
a divided court.
In this very important ease, which
was, of course most carefully and fully
argued, the court, by a bare majority,
decided that the Elevated Railroad could
not be erected in front of complainant's
property without first compensating him.
Opinions were delivered by DANPoRTH
and TRAcy, JJ., sustaining this position. Tile ground of the decision seems
to be, that while not owning the fee of
the street, the abutting owner has an
easement to have the street kept as such
-that is, an open highway for the free
passage and transportation of peopleit being implied in the idea of such a
passage-way, that it should be an open
space suitable for houses to front upon.
This easement having been practically
destroyed, the complainants were entitled to compensation.
From this
reasoning and conclusion EARL, J., dissents in a long and vigorous opinion,
denying the existence of such an easement and denying also that there has
been any taking of property within the
meaning of the constitution. As in one
or two former cases, the argument of
counsel was largely directed to definitions of "property ;" with regard to
this the learned judge says: "We
should not be embarassed by any
subtle meaning given to the word "property" in the constitutional provision.
The broad meaning sometimes given to
it by law writers whose definitions are
more apt to confuse than to enlighten, or
a meaning which can only be evolved by
philologists and etymologists, was pro-
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bably not in the minds of the framers
of our constitution ; they must be supposed to have used the word in its ordinary and popular signification, as representing something that can be owned
and possessed and taken from one and
transferred to another. In popular parlance, there is a distinction between
taking property and injuring property.
If the word is to have the broad meaning given it by Austin and certain German and French civilians, to whose
definitions our attention has been called,
then it would include every interference
with and injury or damage to land by
which its use and enjoyment became less
convenient or valuable."
It is not surprising, and can hardly be
regretted, that, when confronted with
shocking results of a contrary decision,
as involving the loss of millions of
dollars to owners of private property,
the majority of the court should have
reached the conclusion they did. But
on the other hand, it is impossible to
escape the logical and legal force of the
dissenting opinion. And the opinion
of the majority can hardly be reconciled
with the previous decisions in New York.
And besides, it goes at most to prove
that the plaintiff was entitled to the
value of the "easement" taken from
him-a very difficult thing to arrive at
in such a case. But a better foundation
for the decision could have been found,
it is believed, in the proposition that a
deprivation of the reasonable use of property is propery a taking of it.
The problem is not easy of solution.
Perhaps if the logical result of the principle of consequential damages in such
cases were to be reached, it would necessitate the compensation of every one,
no matter how remotely injured: So
that dwelling-houses, at some distance
from a railroad, but within reach of the
noise, the values of which are thereby
lessened, would have to be paid for to
the extent of such diminution in value.
It is easy to see that there would be

practically no limit to the litigation such
a rule would bring forth, to say nothing
of the practically prohibitory tax it
would impose upon corporations. Over
against this, there is to be set the enormous injustice and hardship which
attend the rule restricting compensation
to cases where the land is actually
taken. And yet if this clear, if somewhat arbitrary line of distinction, is
abandoned, as before remarked, it is
hard to' know where to draw the new
line. The tendency of the law has
been toward a more liberal doctrine
of compensation-noticeable alike in
statute and decision. But it has not yet
gone to the length of requiring compensation for injuries which are indirect
and remote as well as consequential.
Whether it will reach that point in the
future, it is impossible to tell. When
the old rule was formulated, i. e., that
property taken must be paid for, the
kind of consequential injuries complained of to-day had scarcely any existence, if, indeed, they existed at all.
And if property was not directly taken
by a corporation, or directly injured, as
by overflow of a stream caused by damming it below, there was no damage to
be guarded against. The old formula
was copied and retained, as many things
are, until it became of doubtful useful.
ness. New circumstances arose which
could scarcely have been in the view of
the original framers of the rule. It has
often been said that the best way to
repeal a bad law is to enforce it, and the
enforcement of the old rule has in many
cases led to its abrogation, as productive
of flagrant injustice. And it is noticeable that the changes have all been in
There has been no
that direetion.
tendency, as time has gone on, to construe the rule more strictly than its
words require. As against too great a
relaxation of it, it may be urged (and, it
is submitted, with considerable force), that
corporations are of great and lasting
public convenience-that they are great
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institutions of capital, giving employment to numbers of people in every station, from the humblest mechanic to the
greatest capitalist, and affording by
their securities means of investment
to innumerable people not otherwise
concerned in them. And in the benefit conferred by the conveniences they
offer in the case of railroads, telegraph companies, &c., every individual
is a sharer; and it may safely be said
that not one of these who complain
loudest of the injury done them by the
construction of railroads, would consent
to their abolition or to a prohibition of
further railroad building over some one
else's land.
On the other hand there is the plain
fact that the value of property is often
wholly destroyed or nearly so, when not
a square inch of it is taken. And it is
a mockery of .justice to deny to the
owner compensation upon the technical
ground that there has been no physical
taking. No rule will be absolutely
satisfactory-it cannot be hoped that
general convenience and private rights
can both be protected without injury to
either-they are too frequently hopelessly
in conflict. " But on the whole the rule
which limits compensation to cases
where the injury is direct, is probably
the safest-comprehending it in all
cases where a house is shaken', rendered

uncomfortable by smoke, etc., in each
of which cases there is a direct injury
to the property itself. But where the
injury is consequential only, as where the
sound of the cars renders it less desirable
as a dwelling, there being no effect on
the house, but only on the dweller in it,
there should be no compensation ; such a
dweller must console himself with the
thought that in building up the industries
and conveniences of the community,
some individuals must necessarily suffer
and that others have suffered before him
for conveniences which he now enjoys.
And with the further realization (and
this point is noticed by Judge REDFiELD
in Hatch v. Vermont Cent. RailroadCo.,
supra), that had his dwelling been reduced in value by the adjoining dwelling
having been made into a store by a private
individual, he would never for a moment
have felt himself entitled to compensation, and this is precisely analogous to
the indirect and consequential injury
by a railroad. In such cases the damage will rarely be very great, and no
very serious hardship will be worked.
If it be objected that the proposed
rule is artificial and not strictly logical,
this may be admitted. But it is believed
that it can fairly be said of it, that it is
the best which can be adopted consistently with a sound public policy.
Lucius S. LAxDtETn.

Philadelphia.

United States District Courtfor Oregon.
HEENRICH v. PULLMAN, &c., C0.
A master is liable for the act of his servant when done within the scope or general course of his employment, although done contrary to the master's orders.
A car company is responsible to a passenger injured by the negligence of its
porter in letting a pistol, carried by him, fall upon the floor of the car, although he
was carrying tile pistol for a passenger and he was expressly forbidden to carry any
baggage for passengers.
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Julius Moreland, for plaintiff.
Oharles B. Bellinger, for defendant.
J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action is brought by the plaintiff, a citizen of Minnesota,
against the defendant, a corporation formed under the laws of
Illinois, to recover $25,000 damages for an injury to her person,
received while travelling as a passenger on a Pullman palace car
attached to a train on the Northern Pacific Railway running from
St. Paul to Portland, and caused as alleged, by the negligent handling of a pistol by the porter in charge of said car while "in the
discharge of his duty as such porter," and "while attending to the
defendant's business," whereby the same fell on the car floor and
was discharged, the ball entering the thigh of the plaintiff and
inflicting a dangerous wound therein.
The answer of the defendant controverts the allegation of the
plaintiff that the porter "was in the discharge of his. duty" when
he let the pistol fall; and also contains a plea in bar of the action
-that the pistol mentioned in the complaint was the property of
a passenger on said train; that said porter received it from the
owner and was carrying it through the car at the request of said
owner, and not otherwise, at the time of the discharge and wounding in the complaint mentioned;- and that it is one of the defendant's rules and directions to all its car porters that they are not
permitted to receive any package, baggage or article of luggage
from passengers or to become custodians thereof, which rule and
order was at the time of the thking and carrying of said pistol by
said porter, well known to him ; and that said porter in so receiving
and carrying said pistol was acting in violation of the defendant's
orders.
To this new matter the plaintiff demurs, for that it does not
constitute a defence to the action.
A corporation is liable to the same extent as a natural person
for an injury caused by its servant in the course of his employment: Moore v. FitchburgRailroad Co., 4 Gray 465; Thayer v.
Boston, 19 Pick. 511.
In Story on Agency, sec. 452, it is laid down that a principal
is liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds, deceits,
concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences and other malDEADY,
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feasance and omissions, although the principal did not authorize
or justify, or participate in, or, indeed, know of such misconduct,
or even if he forbade the acts or disapproved of them. In all such
cases the rule applies, respondeat superior; and it is founded on
public policy and convenience; for in no other way could there be
any safety to third persons in their dealings, either directly with
the principal, or indirectly with him through the instrumentality
of agents. In every such case the principal holds out his agent
as competent and fit to be trusted, and thereby, in effect, he warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within the scope
of his agency.
In Ranisden v. Boston & Albany Railroad Co., 104 Mass. 117,
it was held, that the corporation was liable to an action for an
assault and battery, for the act of its conductor in wrongfully and
unlawfully attempting to seize the parasol of a passenger for her
fare. In delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice GRAY
said : "If the act of the servant is within the general scope of
his employment, the master is equally liable, whether the act is
wilful or merely negligent, or even if it is contrary to an express
order of the master."
In The Pila., ft., Railroad Co. v. -Derby,14 How. 468, a
servant of the corporation ran an engine on its track contrary to
its express order, and thereby caused a collision in which the
defendant was injured; and it was held that the corporation was
liable for the injury. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr.
Justice GrIEf said: "The rule of respondeat superior, or that
the master shall be civilly liable for the tortious acts of his servant, is of universal application, whether the act be one of omission or commission, whether negligent, fraudulent or deceitful. If
it be done in the course of his employment, the master is liable;
and it makes no difference that the master did not authorize, or
even know of the servant's act or neglect, or even if he disapproved
or forbade it, he is equally liable, if the act be done in the course
of his servant's employment.
The authorities to this point might be multiplied indefinitely;
but these are sufficient.
Tried by them, this defence is clearly bad. It is not alleged that
the corporation commanded the porter to do the act which caused
the injury to the plaintiff, and therefore if it was not done in the
-ourse of his employment it is not liable therefor. But if the act
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was done in the course of his employment, the corporation is liable
to the plaintiff for the injury caused thereby, notwithstanding the
order to the porter. The case, so far as appears, must turn on
the issue made by the denial of the allegation that the porter was
in the discharge of his duty or the course of his employment, at
the time he let the pistol fall. And whether he was acting contrary to his employer's orders or not, is altogether immaterial.
In Wharton on Negligence, sec. 157, in discussing this subject
the learned author says: "That he who puts in operation an
agency which he controls, while he receives its emoluments is
responsible for the injuries it incidentally inflicts. Servants are
in this sense machinery, and for the defects of his servants within
the scope of their employment the master is as much liable as for
the defects of his machines."
And Cooley on Torts 539, says: "It is immaterial to the
master's responsibility that the servant at the time was neglecting
some rule of caution which the master had prescribed, or was
exceeding his master's instructions, or was disregarding, them in
some particular, and that the injury which actually resulted is
attributable to the servant's failure to observe the directions given
him. In other words, it is not sufficient for the master to give
proper directions; he must also see that they are obeyed," and
on page 540, the learned author gives an apt illustration of the
rule. A farm servant burned over the fallow when the 'wind was
from the west, and thereby destroyed the adjoining premises on
the east, although he had been directed on that very account, not
to set out the fire unless the wind was in the west, and the master
was held responsible.
The cases cited by counsel are not in conflict with this conclusion. They are Wharton on Neg., sec. 168; Tuller v. Voght, 13
Ili.
285 ; Oxford v. Peter, 28 Ill. 435; Foster v. The -ssex Bank,
17 Mass. 508; Mali v. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381. They are only to
the effect, as is said in Oxford v. Peter, that the master is not
liable "for the wilful or malicious acts of the servant, unless it is
in furtherance of the business of the master." The conclusion in
these cases was not as to the rule of law, but the application of it,
whether the act complained of was done in the furtherance of the
business of the master, or rather in the course of the servant's
employment.
Sometimes this is a very nice question and difficult to deter-

HEENRICII r. PULLMAN, &c., CO.

463

mine, but the rule of law is, I think, undisputed-that where the
servant is acting in the course of, or within the scope of his
employment, the master is liable for his acts of commission or
omission as if they were his own; and this, notwithstanding the
servant may have acted contrary to his master's orders.
Whether the fact complained of in this case was within the scope
of the porter's employment, on that occasion, will be ascertained
from the evidence on the trial of the issue elsewhere made in the
case.
The demurrer is sustained.
A distinction not very clear, however, has been made where the injury
occurs during the performance of a contract or obligation, and where it sounds
entirely in tort. In the former case the
master being bound to perform the contract, if le permits it to be done by
another lie is responsible for the performance. This arises mostly in carriage of passengers for hire. The passenger pays his fare, and the carrier undertakes to carry the passenger to his destination as safely as human foresight can
do it, treat him respectfully, and protect
him from injury fiom others in the same
conveyance.
In Brand v. Railroad, 8 Barb. 368,
the court said that a passenger on board
a stage coach or railroad car, and a person on foot in the street do not.stand in
the same relation to the carrier. To-,
ward the passenger the liability springs
from a contract. Toward the other the
carrier is under no obligation but that
of justice and humanity. Hence a passenger who is injured by a servant of the
carrier, may have a right of action
against him, when one not a passenger,
for a similar injury would not.
In Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason
242, Judge STORY stated that a passenger's contract entitles him to respectful
treatment, and expressed the hope that
every violation of this right would be
risited with its appropriate punishment.
In Nieto v. Clark, I Clifford 145, the

steward of the ship assaulted and grossly
insulted a female passenger, and Judge
CLIFFORD, in holding the defendant liable, stated that the contract of all passengers entitles them to respectful treatment and protection against rudeness,
and every wanton interference with their
persons from all those in charge. In
Railroad v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388, the
court said that where the misconduct of
the servant causes a breach of the master's contract, he will be liable whether
such misconduct be wilful or merely negligent. In Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railroad Co., 57 Me. 202 ; 2 Am. Rep. 39 ;
WALTON, J., stated "the law requires the
common carrier of passengers to exercise
the highest degree of care that human
judgment and foresight are capable of to
make his passenger's journey safe. Whoever engages in the business impliedly
promises that his passengers shall have
this degree of care. In other words, the
carrier is conclusively presumed to have
promised to do what, under the circumstances, the law requires him to do. We
say conclusively presumed, for the law
will not allow the carrier, by notice or
special contract even, to deprive his passenger of this degree of care. If the
passenger does not have such care, but
on the contrary, is unlawfully assaulted
and insulted by one of the very persons
to whom his conveyance is intrusted, the
carrier's implied promise is broken, and
his legal duty is left unperformed, and
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he is necessarily responsible to the passenger for the damages he thereby sustains. The passenger's remedy may be
either in assumpsit or tort at his election.
In the one case he relies upon the breach
of the carrier's common-law duty in support of his action ; in the other upon a
breach of his implied promise. The form
of the action is important only upon the
question of damages. In actions of
assumpsit the damages are generally
In actions
limited to compensation.
of tort the jury are allowed greater latitude, and in proper cases may give
exemplary damages." In Landreux v.
Bel, 5 La. (0. S.), 434, the court said
that carriers are responsible for the misconduct of their servants towards passengers to the same extent as for their
misconduct in regard to merchandise
committed to their care, and that no satisfactory distinction can be drawn between the two cases. In Croker v. The
Chicago and Vorthwestern Railway Co.,
36 Wis. 357; 17 Am. Rep. 504, the
defendants' servant, the conductor on
the passenger train, forcibly kissed the
plaintiff, a young lady passenger, and in
an action to recover for the assault, a
verdict for $1000 was sustained ; the
court, in rejecting the argument that the
master is not responsible for the wilful
or wanton acts of the servant, such as
this was, stated that it was the duty of
the company, under its contract with the
plaintiff, to protect her from the assault,
and if it delegate it to an agent or servantwho failed to perform it, it was immaterial whether the failure was accidental,
or wilful, or through the negligence or
malice of the servant.
Chief Justice SHAW said that the carrier of passengers is liable for injury
resulting from the failure, negligence, or
wilful, wanton or criminal conduct of
the servant in whose charge the passenger has been placed, and that the carrier
"is in a condition somewhat similar to
that of an innkeeper whose premises are

open to all guests," and who "is bound
to so regulate his house with regard to
the peace and comfort of his guests as
to repress and prohibit all disorderly
conduct therein:" Com. v. Power, 7
Metc. 601. In Weed v. PanamaRailroad Co., 17 N. Y. 362, the defendant
was held liable for the wilful or negligent conduct of the conductor in detaining the train over night in an unhealthy
locality, whereby the plaintiff became
ill from the exposure; and also the
plaintiff, while a passenger, was unlawfully assaulted by the steward of the boat
and some of the table waiters, a verdict of $8000 against the defendants was
sustained ; but the court did not place
the ground of the recovery on the defendants' duty under the contract, but upon
the ground that the assault was committed in course of the servants' employment; remarking that if such servants
"had met the plaintiff in the street or
elsewhere, in a position wholly disconnected with their duties to the defendant
and committed the assault, it is clear that
the defendants would not have been liable :" Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180.
The question is upon which ground
should the liability rest: on the violation of the contract or on the ground that
the servant acted within his employment
or authority. Besides the foregoing the
followiig cases assert that the ground is
the violation of the contract: RailroadCo.
v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277 ; Railroad v.
Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512 ; Simmons v. .ew
Bedford, 6-c., Steamboat Co., 97 Mass.
361 ; 100 Id. 34 ; Railroadv.Kinney, 10
Wis. 388, and in one of the cases, Pendleton v. Kinsleg, the court stated that passengers do not contract merely for transportation, but also contract for good treatment, and against personal rudeness and
every wanton interference with their
persons.
On the other hand the following cases
placed the liability on the ground that
the servant acted within his employment.
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Ii Ramsdel et ux. v. Boston .- Albany
Railroad Ca., 104 Mass. 117, the plaintiff, a fenale passenger oi defendants'
train, paid her fare to the conductor, but
was soon thereafter called upon to pay
again, which she refused, informing the
conductor that she had paid him. The
conductor denied this, used alsive
and insulting huiguage to her, and
took hold of, and forcibly wrenched
her parasol from her possession. The
railroad company was held responsible ;
GRAY, Justice, stating that "r the use of
unwarrantable violence in attempting to
collect fare of the plaintiff was as much
within the scope of tile conductor's employment as the exercise or threat of
unjustifiable force in ejecting a passenger from the cars. Neither the corporation nor the conductor has any more
lawful authority to needlessly kick a
passenger or make him jump from the
cars when in motion than to wrest from
the hands of a passenger, an article of
apparel, or personal use, for the purpose
of compelling payment of fare. Either
is an unlawful assault, but if committed
in the exercise of the general power
vested by the corporation in the conductor, the corporation as well the conductor
is liable to the party injured." In Pekt v.
N. Y. C. RailroadCo., 6 T. & C. 436,
the defendants set apart a car for ladies,
and gentlemen accompanied with ladies.
A brakeman was stationed at the entrance of the cars to direct passengers
what car to take. The plaintiff not
being accompanied by a lady, entered
the car reserved for ladies, and the
brakeman directed him to go into another
car, which he refused to do, and, thereupon the brakeman forcibly removed
him. In an action for the assault the
defendants urged that the servant's duty
being only to direct which car to take,
exceeded his authority, and was not acting within the scope of his employment
in forcibly removing the plaintiff, but
this was overruled, the court stating that
VoL. XXX .- 59

as the brakeman was directed by the person in charge to see that gentlemen without ladies did not enter that car, it was
in tie performance of that service that lie
did the act complained of. "The order
to the brakeman and his performance (in
the manner he did) warrants the conclusion, even as a matter of law, that he
was acting witlin the scope of his employment."
In an English case: Bowleg v. Railroad
Co., L. R., 7 C. P. 415, the plaintiff was
violently pulled out of the car by the
company's porter, who acted under an
erroneous impression that the plaintiffwas
in the wrong car. The porter's instructions were to direct passengers to the
right cars. The court held that this act
of the porter was within the scope of his
employment, and the company was
responsible for the assault.
In Moore v. Railroad, 4 Gray 465, the
plaintiff was forcibly put out of a car for
not giving up his ticket or paying his
fare, when, in fact, he had already surrendered his ticket to some one employed
on the train ; the corporation was held
liable for the assault. In Seymour v.
Greenwood, 7 H. & N. 354, the plaintiff
was assaulted and forcibly taken out of defendant's omnibus by one of the latter's
servants, and it was held that the verdict against the defendant was right. In
Railroad v. linney, 10 Wis. 388, the
plaintiff was unlawfully put out of a car
by the conductor, the railroad was held
liable, the court stating that where the
misconduct of the servant causes a breach
of the master's contract, the master will
be liable whether such misconduct be
wilful or merely negligent. In Railroad
v. Vandiver, 42 Pa. St. 365, the passenger received injuries by being thrown
from the platform of the car because he
refused to pay his fare or show his ticket,
he averring that be had a ticket, but
could not find it. It was urged that the
injuries were the result of force and violence on the part bf the servant, which
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were not within the scope of the servant's
authority, and hence the company was
not liable. But the court held otherwise,
and said "a railroad company selects
its own employees and is bound to employ none but capable, prudent and
humane men, and in the present case the
company and its agents were all liable for
the injury done to the deceased."
In Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How.
468, the servant of the company took an
engine and ran it over the road contrary
to express orders, and the company was
held responsible for the injuries inflicted.
In Railway v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512,
some intoxicated persons got into the car
and caused a fight, in which the plaintiff
below got his arm broken, and the company was held responsible. In Fint v.
Trans. Co., 34 Conn. 554, the defendant
was held liable for injuries inflicted by
the dischrge of a gu dropped by some
soldiers engaged in a scuffle.
The plaintiff in Isaacs v. Tne nird
Avenue Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 122,
being a passenger on the car, notified the
conductor to stop at Spring street.
When there she rang the bell to stop,
and passed out on the platform and asked the conductor to stop. He replied that
he was stopped enough, she replied that
she would not get off until the car came
to a full stop, whereupon the conductor
placed both of his hands on her shoulder
and pushed her off. She fell on the
pavement and her leg was broken. The
testimony showed that the conductor forcibly, and intentionally pushed the
plaintiff off of the car, and the court held
that the defendant was not liable, the act
of the conductor being wilful or wanton,
and not within the scope of his employment. This case, however, is against the
current of authority, and the cases in the
same court: Drew v. Railroad Co., 26
N. Y. 49 ; Rounds v. Railroad, 5 T. &
C. 475 ;
ea v. Railroad, 62 N. Y.
180 ; Peck v. .Railroad, 6 T. & C. 436 ;
Sanfordv. Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. 343.

On the same ground it was held that
the master was liable, and the servant
acted within the scope of his authority or
employment where he ejected a passenger from the car because he refused to
pay an additional sum over and above
the fare, although he informed the conductor that he had endeavored to get a
ticket, but failed in consequence of the
default of the agent: Railroad Co. v.
Rogers, and where the servant who was
a freight conductor with orders to allow
no one to ride in any freight car, found
the plaintiff in one and pushed him
off while the train was in motion :
Holmes v. Wakefield et al., 12 Allen
580, and where the baggage master, under orders to permit no one to ride in the
baggage car discovered the plaintiff and
ordered him off, and on being refused
kicked him off, whereby he was injured:
Rounds v. Railroad, 5 T. & C. 475, and
where he ordered a boy, who was riding
wrongfully on the car, to jump off while
the car was in motion, which the boy did,
whereby he was injured: Lovett v.
Railroad Co., 9 Allen 557, and where
the plaintiff desired to cross the street,
and for that purpose stepped on the
platform of the car which obstructed
the crossing, whereupon the driver
pushed her off, and she fell and broke her
arm: Sheav. RailroadCo., 62N. Y. 180,
and where the plaintiff was thrown from
the car while in motion upon his refusal
to pay his fare : Sanford v. Railroad Co.,
23 N. Y. 343, and where a passenger was
forcibly and violently ejected : Seymour v.
Greenwood, 7 H. & N. 356, and where the
servant whose employment was to clean
cars and keep persons out, kicked a boy
off while the car was in motion, whereby
he was killed: Railroad Co. v. Hack, 66
Ill. 238 ; and for the wrongful arrest
the plaintiff: Goff v. Railroad Co., 3
El. & El. 672; Porter v. Railroad Co.,
41 Iowa 358; Allen v. Railroad Co., L.
R., 6 Q. B. 65; and see Poultonv. Railroad Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. 534; Mali v.
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Lord, 39 N. Y. 381, and for an assault
ronmnitted by the servant whilst in
charge of his master's bziness : lV'alker
v. Railroad Co., 39 L. J. C. P. 346.
The ground for the liability in all
other cla--cs of cases is that the act of
the servant is within the scope of his employment, and te distinction that in
carriers of passengers it rests on a violacontract seems to be against
tion of tile
the weight of authority and the reasons
for the liability.
Perhaps a better statement of the rule
is, that the master is liable for any act
which the servant does whilst doingthe business with which the master entrusted him,
whether that act is negligent, careless,
unlawful, wilful, wanton, reckless, im"If a servant
proper or malicious.
driving his master's carriage carelessly
runs over a bystander, or if a gamekeeper employed to kill game, carelessly
fires at a hare and shoots a person passing by; or if a workman employed by a
builder in building a house, negligently
throws a stone or a brick from a scaffold
and so hurts a passer by * * the person
injured has a right to treat the wrongful
act as the act of the maste." Because
"if the master himself had driven improperly or fired carelessly, or negligently thrown the stone or brick, he
would have been directly responsible,
and the law does not permit him to
escape liability because the act complained of was not done with his own
hand." Lord Cnx wo:Tu in Bartonhills
Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macqueen (Sc.)
283. In a late case in Minnesota : Marrier v. St. Paul, 3inneapolis 6- fanitoba
Railroad Co., 29 Alb. L. J. 255, section
men employed by the railroad company
in charge of a foreman, built a fire on
the right-of-way to warm their dinner,
the foreman assisting. The fire was not
extinguished, and spread to plaintiff's
land and destroyed his hay. The company did not board the workmen. The
court held that making the fire for that

purpose was not within the employment
of tile workmen, and hence the defendants were not liable, the court stating
that the liability rests upon the maxims
qui fcit per aliun facit per se and
respohdeat superior; the universal

test

being, was there authority for doing the
act ? Was it done in the course and
within the scope of the servant's employment, and if it was, the master is
liable whether the act was negligent,
fraudulent, deceitful or an act of positive
The liability does not
malfeasance.
arise when the servant steps outside of
his employment to do an act for himself,
not connected with the master's business,
and in determining whether or not a particular act is done in the course of the
servant's employment, it is proper first
to inquire whether the servant was at the
time engaged in serving his master. If
the servant step aside from his master's
business for however short a time to do
an act not connected with such business,
the relation of master and servant is for
that time suspended. Hence the act of
these section men in building a fire to
warm their own dinner was in no sense
an act done in the course of1 and within
the scope of their employment, or in the
execution of the defendants' business.
For the time being they had stepped
aside from their master's business, and
engaged exclusively in their own business as much as they were when eating
their dinner, and were for the time being
their own masters as much as when they
ate their breakfast thatmorning, or went
to bed the night before. The fact that
they built the fire on the defendants'
right-of-way is immaterial, unless the
defendants knew of, or authorized the
act. Had they gone on the plaintiff's
farm and built the fire, the ease woald
have been precisely the same. It is just
the same as if one of these men in lighting his pipe after eating dinner, had
carelessly thrown the burning match
into the grass. If it was the duty of the
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foreman to look after the premises generally, and extinguish fires that might be
ignited on them, his omission to put out
the fire might possibly, within the case of
Chapman v. Railroad, 33 N. Y. 369, be
considered the negligence of the defendant. But nothing of this kind appears.
To the same.effect is Woodman v. Joiner,
10 Jur. (N. S.) 852, where the plaintiff
permitted the defendant to use his shed
for doing a piece of carpentering, and the
carpenter employed by the defendant, in
lighting his pipe, set the shed on fire, and
it was held that the defendant was not
liable. But on that part of the opinion
in Mturrier v. Railroad Co., which states
that "if the servant step aside from his
master's business for however short a
time, to do an act not connected with
such business, the relation of master and
servant is for that time suspended" the
case of McCoun v. N. Y. C. Railroad
Co., 66 Barb. 338, may not fit. In that
case a person upon the defendants'
engine stepped aside from the work he
was engaged in, and threw a burning
brand near the plaintiff's land, which set
fire to the grass and burned over the
plaintiff's land, and the court held the
defendant liable.
Another distinction has been attempted

to be made in some cases, that the master
is not liable for a trespass which results
from a violation of his express orders or
which he has not expressly assented to:
Lyons v. Mortin, 8 Ad. & El. 512;
Bolingbroke v. ,Swindon, L. R., 9 C. P.
575; Oxford v. Peter, 28 Il. 434, as
when the servant was directed to drive
cattle out of a certain field the master
was held not responsible, if the servant
drove them elsewhere (Oxford v. Peter,
supra), on the ground, perhaps, that in the
*absence of express authority, the law will
ndt imply authority to do an unlawful
act. But this distinction is not tenable,
add has been repudiated and the doctrine
asserted that within the employment the
master is liable for all the acts of the servant whether unlawful or not: Green
v. Omnibus Co., 7 C. B. N. S. 290;
Goff v. Railroad Co., 3 El. & El.
672; Barden v. Felch, 109 Mass.
154; Fraser v. Freeman, 56 Barb.
234 ; Gregory v. Piper, 9 B. & C. 591;
Mansfield v. Church, 20 Conn. 73;
Andrus v. Howard, 36 Ft. 248; Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark. 118 ; Arthurv.
Balch, 23 N. H. 157 ; Weldon v. Railroad, 5 Bosw. 576.
JoHn F. KELLY,
Bellaire, Ohio.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
CORNELIUS LYDECKER v. ANDREW D. BOGERT.
Where a mortgagee of lands recovered a judgment on his bond, sold the mortgaged premises under execution, and purchased them himself, the mortgagor is not,
ipsofacto, entitled to an injunction to restrain him from selling other lands of the
mortgagor under his judgment, on the ground that the purchase of the equity of
redemption extinguished the mortgage debt, but the mortgagor may enjoin such
other sales until it shall have been determined, in this court, whether the mortgagee
ought to be permitted to raise any more money, by execution, on account of the
debt, and if so, how much.

BILL for injunction.

On final hearing.

C. iH. Voorhis, for complainant.
C. Christie, for defendant.
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The CIIAXcELLoR.-The defendant held a bond and a mortgage

of real estate given to him by the complainant. Ile recovered a
judgment at law against the complainant for the mortgage debt,
and under execution sold the mortgaged premises, which he purchased at the sale. Ile then proceeded to sell other lands of the
complainant, under the execution, to raise the balance due thereon
after crediting the amount raised by the sale of the mortgaged
premises. The bill is filed to restrain him from selling.
The complainant insists that the purchase by the defendant of
the equity of redemption was an extinguishment of the mortgage
debt, and in support of this claim cites Stevenson v. Black, Saxt.
838, and Hfartshorne v. Hartshorne, 1 Green Oh. 849. That,
however, is not the law in this state. Cattel v. Warwick, 1
Hal. 190.
In Tice v. Annin, 2 Johns. Ch. 125, it was held by Chancellor
KENT that if a mortgagee, instead of resorting to a bill of foreclosure, seeks to collect the mortgage-money out of other property
of the mortgagor, equity will either stay his proceeding, or compel
him to assign his bond and mortgage to the mortgagor; and so,
too, if he sells the equity of redemption under an execution at law.
And if, as in that case, the mortgagee, after selling the equity of
redemption under the execution at law, assigns his bond and mortgage to the purchaser, equity will decree that the debt is paid.
In Stevenson v. Black (1831), the defendant had levied upon
the equity of redemption, under execution on a judgment recovered by him for part of the mortgage debt, and had purchased it
at the sale expressly subject to the mortgage. The Chancellor
(Voom) said that the purchase extinguished the whole of his debt.
In Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, which was decided by Chancellor PENNINGTON in 1840, the question was not presented for
decision.
In Deare v. Carr, 2 Gr. Ch. 513, decided by Chancellor VRtooM
in 1836, the question was again before him, and he held that if'
the mortgage creditor became the purchaser of the mortgaged
premises at the sheriff's sale, under an execution issued upon a
judgment rendered for the mortgage debt, the debt was not wholly
extinguished, but only to the amount of the purchase-money.
And it was so held afterwards, in 1854, byChancellor WILLIAMSON,
in Speer v, Whitfteld, 2 Stock. 107. In that case he lays down
the law on the subject as follows : "If the mortgagee purchases
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the mortgaged premises subject to the mortgage, he cannot hold the
land and enforce the payment of the mortgage debt against the
mortgagor; but he may hold his mortgage to protect his title. If
he purchased the mortgaged premises on an execution at law
against the mortgagor in favor of a third person, he purchases subject to the mortgage, and thereby extinguishes his debt. Or if he
purchases the mortgaged premises under an execution upon ajudgment for his mortgage debt, he thereby extinguishes his debt to
the amount he gave for the land." He adds: "In this case,
Speer sold the mortgaged premises to satisfy his debt secured by
the mortgage, and he purchased them for $33. Had the premises
been sold for this debt alone, Speer would be obliged to give a
credit of $33 on his interest in the mortgage, but as his judgment
was for a much larger sum than the amount of his interest in the
mortgage (his debt was, with claims of other persons, secured by the
mortgage which was in the form of an absolute deed to one Whitfield), the $33 must be credited on the whole judgment debt, and
the credit upon the mortgage must be in the proportion the mortgage bears to the judgment debt."
In that case, and in Deare v. Carr, the parties were before this
court in proceedings for foreclosure of the mortgaged premises, and
there was no difficulty in doing justice between them. In Tce v.
Annin, Chancellor KENT says, speaking of the embarrassment in
disposing of the subject by any entirely satisfactory adjudication,
that the true and only remedy is to prevent such sales ; that the
mortgagee should be prohibited from proceeding at law to sell the
equity of redemption, and ought, in every case, to be put to his
election to proceed directly upon the mortgage, or else to seek

other property (if the rights of other creditors do not interpose)
or the person of the debtor, to obtain satisfaction of his debt, and
that he sees no other way to prevent a sacrifice of the interest of
the mortgagor. This view has been adopted by this court, and
acted upon in Severns v. Woolston, 3 Gr. Oh. 220, and Fan Mater
v. Conover, 3 C. E. Gr. 38, and in other unreported cases, wher6
injunctions were granted to restrain mortgagees from selling the
equity of redemption under executions upon judgments recoveked
for the mortgage debts. This court is open to afford that relief,
and if the mortgagor, having the opportunity, should not choose to
avail himself of his right, he could not reasonably complain if the
property should be sacrificed at the sale. Moreover, equity will,
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if he come in in due time, afford him relief on a proper case, upon
a bill to redeem. Where the mortgaged premises are of but very
little value, while the mortgage debt is large, it would, manifestly,
be very unreasonable and unjust to hold that, by the sale of the
premises at law for the payment of the mortgage debt, the mortgagee is to lose the balance of his debt. It might be that the
mortgaged premises have a merely nominal value, and would not
pay the expense of foreclosure proceedings. In such case, if the
creditor, having obtained a judgment at law for the mortgage debt,
should sell the equity of redemption under the execution, he would,
if the doctrine contended for by the complainant is the true one,
lose his debt, and the mortgagor be discharged therefrom without
paying it or parting with anything of value for it, or being put to
any pecuniary disadvantage in connection with it, for what the
mortgagor would part with and the mortgagee get, would be of no
value. The mortgagee, in fact, would unjustly lose his debt
merely through the application of a doctrine of equity, a result not
to be contemplated or allowed. The bond is the debt, and the
mortgage is the pledge for its payment. If the creditor proceeds
to sell the thing pledged, under inequitable circumstances, he may
be restrained in equity, and if he has sold it under such circumstances, and bought it himself, the mortgagor may redeem, or it
may be sold, or its value appraised and established in equity, in
order to do justice between the parties. If a third party has
bought it, subject to the mortgage, the mortgagor may obtain such
relief against him as will be equitable. The main difficulty in dealing with the subject arises from the fact that the mortgagee, in
selling the premises under execution at law, for his mortgage debt,
sells subject to his mortgage-that is, he sells the equity of
redemption merely, and if he buys it, it is to be presumed that he
has had the benefit of his mortgage debt in the allowance of the
amount in his purchase, for, buying subject to it, what he bids is
bid for the property over and above the mortgage. Such would be
the effect of a stranger's bid, and such will be the effect of his own.
If he purchases the property and comes into equity for foreclosure
of his mqrtgage, as was the case in Speer v. WMitfield, or is
brought into court on such proceedings as in Deare v. Carr, equity
will be done by charging him with his bid as a payment on his
mortgage debt, and requiring the mortgagor to pay the balance,
or be foreclosed, or by decreeing a sale of the property. If he buys
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expressly subject to his mortgage, his mortgage debt is extinguished.
Where the sale is not expressly subject to the mortgage, the mortgagor may restrain him, in equity, from proceeding to sell other
property until he shall have done what equity requires, which -ill
be to credit on his debt what he ought to credit, in view of his
purchase of the property under the circumstances. In the case in
hand, the mortgagor has permitted the mortgagee to sell the mortgaged premises under his judgment. The mortgagee bought them.
They did not bring enough to pay the debt. The mortgagee
is now proceeding at law, as he lawfully may, to make the balance
due him out of the mortgagor's other property. These facts alone
are not sufficient to entitle the complainant to a decree that the
debt is extinguished. But he is entitled to have the injunction
continued, restraining the defendant from proceeding to sell under
the execution at law until after it shall have been determined in
this suit whether he ought, under the circumstances, to be permitted to raise any more money by execution, on account of the
debt, and if anything, how much.
The general rule is stated to be that a
mortgagee cannot sell to another person
or purchase himself the equity of redemption at an execution sale at law on the
bond secured by his mortgage, 2 Jones
on Mort. see. 1229 ; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur.,
sec. 1204; and see the following additional cases: Lesley v.Shock, 3 Houst.
131, reversing S. c. 2 Del. Ch. 304 ; s.
c., 4 Del. Ch. 96 ; Atkins v. Sawyer, 1
Pick. 351, 11 Am. Dec. 194 note; Boswell v. Carlisle, 55 Ala. 554; Schnell v.
Schroder, Bail. Eq. 334 ; UcLure v.
Wheeler, 6 Rich. Eq. 343; Snyder v.
Blair, 6 Stew. Eq. 212 ; Hill v. Smith,
2 McLean 446; Swigert v. Thomas, 7
Dana 220.
But the rule is by no means universal,
2 Jones on Mort., sec. 1229, and these
additional cases: Clos v. Boppe, 8 C. E.
Gr. 270 ; Johnston v. Watson, 7 Blackf.
174; (now controlled in Indiana by
statute, Boone v. Armstrong, 87 Ind.
168) ; Cottingham v. Springer, 88 Ill.
90 ; Bank of Kentucky v. Milton, 12 B.
Mon. 340; Jackson v. I,,ll, 10 Johnc.
481 ; Jewitt v. McGowen, R. M. Charlt.

392; Fowler v. Dupassau, 3 Mart. (La.)
574 z Dabney v. Green, 4 Hen. & Mnf.
101 ; McCall v. Lenox, 9 S. & R. 307 ;
Wilhelm v. Lee, 2 Md. Ch. 324; Lavillebeuvre v. Frederic, 20 La. Ann. 374 ;
MIeClure v. Mounce, 2 McCord 423;
Fithian v. Corwin, 17 Ohio St. 118; see
Booth v. Williams, 11 Phila. 266;
Loomis v. Stuyvesant, 10 Paige 490 ;
Bonnell v. Henry, 13 How. Pr. 142;
Rollins v. Henry, 86 N. C. 714 ; Kansas
City Sa. Assn. v. 3astin, 61 Mo. 435;
Harrisonv. .Eldridge, 2 Hal. 392.
Tile arrest of a mortgagor on a capias
for the bond debt, and his discharge by the
mortgagee, does not preclude the mortgagee from afterwards foreclosing, Davis
v. Battine, 2 Russ. & Myl. 76; McPhclim v. W)eldon, 5 Allen N. B. 358.
A mortgagee's purchasing the equity
of redemption at an insolvent sale of the
mortgagor's lands by the mortgagor's administrator, does not extinguish his debt
against the estate so as to exclude him
from his share of the assets, Findlay v.
Hosmer, 2 Conn. 350 ; Walkerv. Barker,
26 Vt. 710.

